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Abstract
In their recent paper, Geurts & van Tiel (2013) review a range of evidence on
the availability of embedded scalar enrichments (upper-bound construals,
or UBCs). They argue that these readings are not readily available, except
when triggered by contrast effects, and conclude that the experimental data
do not support a conventionalist view of implicature. They also consider
how some of these data can be analysed as exhibiting typicality effects.
In this commentary, I focus on the claim that typicality effects apply to
quantifiers, and consider some of its implications for our view of semantics
and pragmatics. In particular, I look at whether these effects are general to
embedded and non-embedded contexts, whether and how typicality relates to
truth-conditional narrowing, and the implications of this view for the nature
of pragmatic enrichment. I conclude that typicality effects are indeed in
evidence in the data elicited so far, and that this opens up several promising
new avenues for the study of quantification in natural language, as well as
challenging our interpretation of existing data.
Keywords: implicature, typicality, quantification
1 Introduction
A flurry of recent experimental research has addressed the vexed question of
so-called “embedded implicatures,” or local upper-bound construals (UBCs):
cases where the pragmatic enrichment of a weak scalar term seems to take
place locally, under the scope of an operator. For instance, it is claimed that
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(1) can give rise to the reading (2), as a consequence of which it conveys that
no square is connected to all of the circles.
(1) Every square is connected to some of the circles.
(2) Every square is connected to some but not all of the circles.
Geurts & van Tiel (2013) review three experimental papers on this topic:
Geurts & Pouscoulous 2009, which argued that embedded UBCs are very
infrequently in evidence, and Clifton & Dube 2010 and Chemla & Spector
2011, which argued that embedded UBCs are relatively widespread in a way
that suggests the inadequacy of a Gricean pragmatic account.1 Geurts & van
Tiel criticise these latter two papers on two distinct grounds. First, they argue
that the materials used give rise to contrast effects, which suggests that the
results can be parsimoniously accounted for on pragmatic grounds after all;
and secondly, they argue that the results can be even better accounted for in
terms of typicality.
On the former point, Geurts & van Tiel emphasise what they see as an
under-appreciated unity between the competing theoretical approaches. It
is, in their view, common to all approaches that truth-conditional narrowing
(for instance, “some” being understood to mean more specifically “some but
not all”) can take place in contrastive environments, just as it is assumed by
all approaches that some form of conversational implicature must exist in
the system (for instance, to account for uncertainty implicatures). What is
disputed is essentially just how truth-conditional narrowing arises, although
this goes on to have substantial implications for when it can occur.
In support of the claim that typicality offers a better explanation of
the experimental data, Geurts & van Tiel (2013) adopt a typicality measure
introduced by van Tiel (2013), which can be used to quantify how typical a
situation is as an instantiation of a sentence. They demonstrate how this
method can be applied to the materials used by Chemla & Spector (2011). For
the sentence (1), this would involve calculating the typicality of the description
“connected to some of the circles” for each square separately, and combining
these typicality ratings into a single measure, by taking either their arithmetic
or harmonic mean. Geurts & van Tiel 2013 show that a measure of this type
1 To infer (2) from the utterance of (1) in a Gricean fashion, we would require some auxiliary
assumption, for instance that every square is connected to the same number of circles. It
seems possible, even within a classically Gricean analysis, that an utterance such as (1) might
influence our beliefs as to whether an appropriate auxiliary assumption also holds. However,
further speculation on this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
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accurately predicts the ratings obtained by Chemla & Spector, and thus that
the results can be explained efficiently by appeal to typicality effects and
without reference to embedded implicatures. Consequently, Geurts & van Tiel
conclude that Chemla & Spector 2011 does not furnish any novel experimental
support for the conventionalist analysis of scalar implicature, and thus argue
in favour of a pragmatic account.
Geurts & van Tiel’s argument with respect to the recent experimental
data thus travels some distance over the course of the paper. They first set
out to establish that embedded UBCs are compatible with all the currently
competing theoretical proposals, and then describe how contrast effects
could be invoked as part of an explanation for the findings of both Clifton
& Dube 2010 and Chemla & Spector 2011. However, for both data sets, they
go on to argue that a typicality-based account is more satisfactory, and that
there is no clear evidence for embedded UBCs in either experiment.
I concur with Geurts & van Tiel that the data elicited so far fail to con-
stitute a compelling case for conventionalism, and have little to add to
their criticisms of the corresponding analyses. However, their typicality-
driven account appears to raise a number of issues with potentially broad
consequences for semantic and pragmatic theory and experimentation. For
instance, given the potential availability of typicality-based explanations
alongside implicature-based accounts, exactly how widespread are such typi-
cality effects? Specifically, can many, or most, apparently embedded UBCs
actually be ascribed to typicality? Does the typicality effect extend to unem-
bedded UBCs, even in contexts where implicatures are predicted on purely
Gricean grounds? Does it matter whether or not implicatures influence truth
judgments? And doesn’t the postulation of typicality effects tend to blur the
distinction between the Gricean and the conventionalist account of implica-
ture?
In this commentary, I attempt to address these points. First, I revisit the
existing experimental data, with a view to establishing what participants are
actually doing in these experimental paradigms, and thus what precisely we
have to explain. Then I consider how and why the typicality effects associated
with quantifiers might vary between embedded and unembedded contexts of
usage. I look briefly at the contrast between typicality and defaultist views
of implicature, and consider the place of typicality in a pragmatic system.
Finally, I consider how it might be possible to derive novel predictions about
implicature if typicality is assumed.
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2 Typicality versus (embedded) UBCs
All three papers discussed by Geurts & van Tiel (2013) report experiments us-
ing broadly similar materials: these were ostensibly meaningless geometrical
diagrams consisting of connected squares, circles, and letters. Participants
were then asked to rate sentences such as (1), repeated below, as descriptions
of these diagrams.
(1) Every square is connected to some of the circles.
The use of such materials has triggered a certain amount of mutual criti-
cism and scepticism between the various sets of authors as to the validity
of the experiments. Objections raised over the course of this debate include
whether the diagrams are comprehensible to participants, in terms of making
the sentences verifiable; and indeed whether the configuration of the dia-
grams suggests that some propositions are likely to be more relevant than
others.
However, perhaps the most important issue concerns what participants
consider themselves to be rating, when they respond to these materials. In
part of Clifton & Dube’s (2010) experiment, participants were presented with
sentences similar to (1) and given a choice between two diagrams, one of
which is true given the embedded UBCs (i.e., each square was connected
to some but not all of the circles) and one of which is false under this
interpretation (i.e., one square was connected to all of the circles, while the
others were connected to some but not all of the circles). The participants
were asked which diagram was best described by the sentence, but were
given a four-way choice – they could select either diagram, respond “both” or
respond “neither”. Among the participants, those who expressed a preference
broke strongly in favour of the diagram that was true given the UBC (39%-3%,
with 57% responding “both”).
The pragmatics of the four-way choice is itself very complicated. (Is it even
felicitous to say that both of the diagrams were best? If not, what question
were the 57% of respondents who said “both” actually answering?) The ratio-
nale for offering such a choice is, fairly clearly, not to force participants to
state a preference if they do not really have one. However, even granted that
justification, there is no evidence that the preference (sometimes) exhibited
reflects any kind of truth-conditional effect. The only certain conclusion is
that the 57% of participants who chose “both” (and the 1% who chose “nei-
ther”) were not materially affected by any kind of truth-conditional narrowing
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in their choice of response, and nor were the 3% who chose the UBC-violating
diagram. There is no clear reason to further suppose that the remaining 39%
were actually motivated by truth-conditional concerns in their statement of
preference.
For Chemla & Spector (2011), the story is very similar. Their participants
were asked to indicate on a continuous scale how “true” or “appropriate”
sentences were as a description of diagrams. Again, diagrams that were
coherent with the UBC of weak embedded scalar “some” were rated higher
than those which were not. But again, the results are not clearly reflective of
truth-conditional effects: specifically, the difference in rating does not appear
to be due to some participants rating the UBC-violating diagrams as clearly
false, as would be expected on a truth-driven account.
Geurts & van Tiel (2013) articulate what I think is a more constructive
objection to the authors’ analyses of their respective data sets, by demon-
strating that the results can be modelled by appeal to typicality. Importantly,
this account also handles the data that arises from other non-critical con-
ditions of Chemla & Spector’s experiment: it provides an explanation for
how one clearly false sentence comes to be rated as more “appropriate”
(presumably not “true”) than another. This observation seems to call for a
typicality-based explanation, and the unified account put forward by Geurts
& van Tiel (2013) seems to offer an especially parsimonious explanation of
the full data set.
More generally, Geurts & van Tiel demonstrate that the patterns in the
data under discussion admit (at least) two distinct interpretations: as local
UBCs (whether or not these are attributable to contrast effects) or as typ-
icality effects. This ambiguity of interpretation arises in part because the
instructions to participants in the above-mentioned papers vacillated between
reference to truth judgments and acceptability judgments. Suppose, as in
the canonical examples, that we have a situation in which a sentence with
“all” would be true, and we test the usage of the corresponding sentence with
“some”. If “some” attracts a UBC, it should be judged as false in a truth-value
judgment task, and also receive a low rating in an acceptability judgment
task. If “some” does not attract a UBC but is subject to typicality effects,
it should be judged as true in a truth-value judgment task, but receive a
low rating in an acceptability judgment task. Consequently, only the truth-




In defence of the use of acceptability judgments, we might argue that
asking whether a sentence is a good description of a situation is more natural
than asking whether, in some technical sense, it is true or false. Moreover, as
experimenters, we may suspect that typical language users, with no specialist
training in logic, will in any case interpret questions about truth or falsity
as questions about acceptability or naturalness. That being the case, these
tasks may not be diagnostic of UBCs as such. The viability of typicality-
based explanations for embedded implicature data thus raises the spectre of
similar explanations being brought to bear on a range of empirical data on
implicature in unembedded contexts. Such an approach would cohere with
the findings of Katsos & Bishop (2011): they showed that hearers unanimously
penalise underinformative utterances (“some” used to describe a situation in
which “all” is true) in acceptability judgment tasks, but only some hearers
judge such utterances false. Hence, Katsos & Bishop’s (2011) findings also
challenge the assumption that dissatisfaction with a quantity expression is a
good indicator of the availability of a scalar implicature that would render
that expression false. Taken together with this work, Geurts & van Tiel’s
(2013) analysis suggests that we may need to exercise considerable caution
in interpreting apparent preferences for UBCs as evidence for implicature in
any technically defensible sense of the word.
3 Typicality in one and two dimensions
In their discussion of Clifton & Dube’s (2010) experiment, Geurts & van Tiel
show that a similar result can be obtained if the experiment is adapted to
use images of entities that are uncontroversially typical and atypical category
members. Their version of the experiment presented participants a picture of
a robin and an ostrich, and asked which picture is best described by “This is
a bird”, again offering a four-way choice (picture A, picture B, both, neither).
Again, a sizeable minority of participants states a preference for one picture,
and of the participants who state a preference, most choose the robin rather
than the ostrich. Here, there is little room to entertain the possibility that
participants are responding on the basis of truth or falsity: “This is a bird” is
just as true of the ostrich, definitionally, but participants nevertheless feel
that it better describes a robin.
Having demonstrated this analogy, Geurts & van Tiel offer a more concrete
proposal for the “some” case. They argue that “some” exhibits typicality
structure, with the most typical meaning of “some (of)” being situated around
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the mid-point of the scale, i.e., referring to about half of the items under
discussion. “Every” on this account also exhibits some typicality structure,
the typical meaning being the literal meaning (“all (of)”).
Evidence in favour of the claimed typicality effect comes from two direc-
tions. First, van Tiel 2013 reports an experiment in which participants are
asked to rate the acceptability of two sentences, “Every circle is black” and
“Some of the circles are black”, used as descriptions of a range of situations
in which 10 circles are presented and some number of them are black. For
the former sentence, only the condition with 10 black circles achieved a high
rating, but ratings monotonically increased as the number of black circles
increased. For the latter, conditions with 2 to 9 black circles received high
ratings, peaking at 5; the condition with 10 black circles received a lower rat-
ing, and the 1 and 0 black circle conditions lower still. Secondly, when these
ratings are used as the basis for a typicality measure, and this measure is
used to predict the acceptability of the sentences used in Chemla & Spector’s
(2011) experiment, the result fits well with their data.
One possible objection to the typicality structure elicited by van Tiel
(2013) is that the task he uses presents quantifiers in an unembedded context.
Most strikingly, it seems possible that the preferences thereby elicited are
themselves influenced by implicature. If a participant establishes a UBC
for the sentence “Some of the circles are black” — which they could do,
uncontroversially, by scalar implicature — then clearly we would expect them
to rate the sentence as suboptimal as a description of a situation in which all
of the circles are black. It is noteworthy that the mean rating for “Some of
the circles are black” in the 10 black circles condition is lower than the mean
rating for “Every circle is black” in the 9 black circles condition, a sentence
that we would not hesitate to call “false”. So, on the face of it, the claim
that “all” is a highly non-typical case of “some” appears to be bound up with
the availability of the scalar implicature. By (Gricean) hypothesis, such an
implicature is restricted to the unembedded case, and should not be able to
tell us anything about the behaviour of “some” in embedded contexts.
In my view, the above objection is not a particularly serious one, in that
there is convergent evidence for approximately the kind of typicality structure
that Geurts & van Tiel posit for “some” which cannot be explained away as a
consequence of implicature. Bååth, Sauerland & Sikstrøm (2010) presented
data from an elicitation study in which participants were presented with a
display of 432 dots, some of which were blue and some yellow (in varying
proportions), and were asked to say how many of the dots were yellow. They
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elicited a wide range of quantifying expressions, including “few”, “some”,
“half”, “many”, “most”, and “almost all”. Notably, the use of “some” was
largely restricted to the middle of the range, being used very infrequently for
small numbers of dots and not at all in situations where the proportion of
yellow dots neared 100%. If we can assume that our interpretative preferences
are attuned reasonably well to other speakers’ production preferences, we can
further assume on this basis that “some” should be preferentially interpreted
as referring to values in the middle of the available range. It seems clear that
Bååth, Sauerland & Sikstrøm’s data are not wholly explicable just in terms of
implicatures, as such an account would predict that “some” should become
unavailable at the point at which “all” (or conceivably “most”) becomes true.
Instead, in their data, “some” fades out gradually as the proportion increases,
becoming unattested at a point some way short of “all”, as more informative
descriptions (“most”, “many”, “almost all”, etc.) come to be preferred. This
pattern appears to conform to expectations about how typicality effects
should behave in the domain of quantifiers.
If the typicality effects elicited by van Tiel (2013) are not due to impli-
cature, that removes the major objection in principle to the application of
their results to the embedded case, which is what Geurts & van Tiel (2013)
do in their discussion of Chemla & Spector 2011. However, we might still ask
whether the landscape of quantification is really the same in the embedded
case as in the unembedded case – that is to say, whether the possible (pre-
ferred) choices of expression divide up the set of possible situations in the
same way as they were shown to do in Bååth, Sauerland & Sikstrøm’s (2010)
study. This issue appears to have received very little attention thus far.
Abstractly, an unembedded scalar term picks out a region in one-dimensional
space (that is, part of a line, which in the case of partitive quantification runs
from “none” to “all”), and the posited typicality effect identifies some sub-part
of that region as typically containing the denotation of the scalar term. By
contrast, an embedded scalar term picks out a region in two-dimensional
space (that is, part of a plane, which in the case of partitive quantification
extends from “none. . . any” to “all. . . all”). In this case, the nature or shape of
the typicality effects is not well understood. We can visualise this if we look
at a two-dimensional data array that plots a set of individuals against a set
of properties and simply indicates whether or not each individual has the
corresponding property.
To take a specific example, consider the situation in Figure 1, which
depicts (the imagined) marks for a group of students over the 10 questions in
8:8
Typicality made familiar
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10
Student 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Student 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Student 3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Student 4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × ×
Student 5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × ×
Student 6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × ×
Student 7 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × × × ×
Student 8 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × × × ×
Student 9 ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × × × × ×
Student 10 ✓ ✓ ✓ × × × × × × ×
Figure 1 Example of two-dimensional data array
an exam. These data could be summarised with sentences (3) or (4), whereas
(5) would be false. As before, the utterance of (3) or (4) uncontroversially
implicates (under the usual conditions for implicature) the falsity of (5).
(3) Some of the students got all of the questions right.
(4) All of the students got questions 1-3 right.
(5) All of the students got all of the questions right.
A more controversial sentence, as far as the UBC is concerned, would be (6).
(6) All of the students got some of the questions right.
There is an additional ambiguity here: (6) could convey that all of the
students got certain specific questions right, as in (4). But I will ignore this
reading for the moment. On the other reading, it conveys that there exists
no student who answered no questions correctly. With the UBC, it would
also convey that there existed no student who answered all the questions
correctly: in this case it would be false for the data presented in Figure 1.
Now, if we apply the typicality findings for “some” to this embedded case,
we would expect to find that the data depicted in Figure 1 can be construed as
an atypical case of (6). “Some” (out of 10 items) typically means 2-9 out of 10,
so the description “got some of the questions right” with a typical construal
applies to only 7 of the 10 students in Figure 1, not to all of them. That is
to say, (6) is true of this situation, but only if we grant that the quantifier
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“some” in (6) is conveying a somewhat atypical meaning. There appears to be
an element of truth to this claim: pilot data from Cummins 2012 showed that
participants in an elicitation task preferred to use option (3), whereas (6) was
the preferred option if none of the students got all of the questions right — a
situation in which the description “got some of the questions right” is true
under a typical construal for all 10 of the students (and in which (3) would,
incidentally, be false).
However, there is also a sense in which the above claim seems to be too
strong. The problem is that the data in Figure 1 are perfectly commonplace,
but there is no efficient way to describe them. It is not at all obvious, on
inspection, whether they are closer to the prototype of (3) than they are to the
prototype of (6). To resolve that question, we would need to understand what
kind of expectations speakers have about the data that are not described
either by assertion or implicature, when they encounter a description like
(3). Does (3) convey any sense of how the other students — those falling
outside the set delimited by “some” — performed in the exam? Yes: it certainly
implicates that they didn’t get all the questions right. But it also suggests
that they didn’t get all the questions wrong, as otherwise (7) would be a
competing utterance and might conceivably be more relevant. Whether (3)
conveys anything else about the distribution is an empirical question.
(7) Some/most of the students got all of the questions wrong.
In short, the landscape of possibilities for the use of embedded quantifiers
is a much more complex one than that for simple quantifiers. And Bååth,
Sauerland & Sikstrøm (2010) show that the situation is already fairly complex
in the latter case, if we admit the existence of typicality effects and are
interested in how quantifying expressions are actually used, rather than
just how they should be treated truth-conditionally. Given the complexity of
the situation, I feel obliged to treat the analysis of Geurts & van Tiel (2013)
with a certain degree of caution, in that it supposes that the behaviour of
simple quantifiers generalises straightforwardly to the embedded case, which
may not be tenable. But more generally, this type of analysis suggests that
the experimental data are running way ahead of any really satisfactory or
comprehensive explanation. It would be unhelpful, and untrue, for me to
assert that so much is going on in the paradigms of Geurts & Pouscoulous
(2009), Clifton & Dube (2010), and Chemla & Spector (2011) that we can’t yet
make any kind of sense of the results. However, I think it is fair to say that
the original analyses of these data sets rely on simplifying assumptions that
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may become increasingly difficult to defend, as we explore the behaviour of
embedded quantifiers more thoroughly.
4 Typicality and truth-conditional narrowing
A potentially important matter arising from Geurts & van Tiel’s (2013) analysis
is the truth-conditional status of quantifiers that exhibit typicality effects.
They emphasise that typicality effects can arise in domains where there is
no difficulty whatsoever as to truth-conditions: there is such a thing as a
prototypical even number, or prime number, etc.2 Moreover, they appear to
be drawing a more or less clear distinction between typicality effects and
truth-conditional narrowing: although the latter can proceed in accordance
with pragmatic principles, and by doing so can explain the experimental data
that they discuss, ultimately they set aside this analysis in favour of a distinct
account based upon typicality effects that does not involve truth-conditional
narrowing or the generation of UBCs.
At the same time, there are reasons to suppose that the distinction
between the two approaches might not be quite so clear-cut. Geurts & van
Tiel (2013, p. 7) are unambiguously discussing the pragmatic view of truth-
conditional narrowing when they make the point that “occasionally the
occurrent meaning of a word will be more specific than its dictionary meaning.
In some cases, this narrowing may proceed quite smoothly, because world
knowledge alone suffices to steer the hearer towards a specific interpretation.”
They go on to discuss cases in which contrastive stress is required in order
for truth-conditional narrowing to proceed pragmatically, which they argue
are not amenable to analysis in conventionalist terms. However, the kind of
typicality effect that they posit for “some” appears to fall squarely within
their characterisation of truth-conditional narrowing, merely of the kind that
proceeds smoothly without the support of contrastive stress. We understand
that “some” conveys something other than the purely existential meaning
that semantics would suggest, but that this is not merely attributable to a
clean scalar implicature derived by contrast with “all” — instead, it reflects an
awareness on our part as to the way in which this word is typically used.
The difference between the typicality account and a lexicalist conven-
tionalist account is, as a consequence, rather subtle. On a lexicalist account,
we say that “some” means “some but not all”, but that the latter part of
this meaning is cancellable. On a typicality account, “some” means some-
2 For example, 2 is both a highly typical even number and a highly atypical prime number.
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thing slightly different from this, in that its meaning happens to exclude or
marginalise the possibility of “all”. The status of this meaning, like its precise
content, is rather difficult to pin down: it appears to be something like a
default inference, in the sense of Levinson 2000. However, it is not obviously
cancellable — it is not clear what it would mean to be able to cancel a typical-
ity effect. And it is not clear that we can usefully appeal to truth-conditions
in trying to characterise such an effect: less typical examples of “some” are
just as true as more typical examples (if we exclude the “all” case).
What appears to be on the table here is a form of content that typically
results in a narrowing of the range of expected meanings, given an utter-
ance, rather than a narrowing of the range of truth-conditionally admissible
meanings. In principle, this is an intriguing prospect, and appears to mesh
with some points hinted at by Levinson (2000) about intermediate levels of
meaning. It remains to be seen whether such an account can be made rigorous
enough to be useful, but if it can, it might be relevant to the interpretation
of a great deal of experimental data (which has often been elicited in rather
non-naturalistic conditions).
5 Typicality-driven (and cancelled) implicatures
It seems clear that Geurts & van Tiel (2013) consider that typicality structure
exists alongside the familiar Gricean mechanisms for quantity implicature.
They wish to emphasise from the outset that so-called “embedded implica-
tures” are not implicatures at all, inasmuch as implicatures are only calculated
at the utterance level: “it is pointless even to consider the possibility than an
implicature might occur in an embedded position” (Geurts & van Tiel 2013,
p. 3). By contrast, typicality effects are presumed to be potentially operative
in any position.
If typicality effects are widespread, it seems credible that they may in-
fluence the availability of certain implicatures. Canonically, the implicature
“some” +> “not all” is explicable on the basis that the speaker would have
uttered the stronger statement if she were able to do so, and — if we further
assume her knowledgeability as to the truth of the stronger statement — we
can conclude that the stronger statement is false, as far as the speaker knows.
Now, if typicality effects are in play, these seem obliged to influence the ad-
missibility of the speaker’s making stronger statements. One should reason
as follows: the speaker made a weaker statement, truth-conditionally. She
could have made a stronger statement. However, in doing so, she would have
8:12
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conveyed not only that the truth-conditions of the stronger statement were
satisfied, but also that the situation was a highly typical one in which that
statement could be uttered.
In the case of “some” +> “not all”, the relevance of such considerations
is at most marginal: although Geurts & van Tiel (2013) hint at the idea that
“all” has typicality structure, there is only one situation that satisfies the
truth-conditions, so typicality cannot take any effect, on the above analysis.
However, if we consider a case like “some” +> “not most”, we may actually
be able to derive a novel prediction based on typicality. Specifically, we can
observe that “most” semantically seems to mean “more than 50%” but appears
typically to convey a larger quantity (Hackl 2009, Bååth, Sauerland & Sikstrøm
2010, Solt 2011). Take a situation in which 51% of the apples are green. The
speaker who utters (8) chooses not to utter (9).
(8) Some of the apples are green.
(9) Most of the apples are green.
We can argue that the choice of (8) need not reflect the falsity of (9),
but could instead be taken to reflect the atypicality of the situation given
an utterance of (9). For this reason, we should expect the implicature to be
unavailable. We reason as follows: we heard the speaker say (8), when they
could have said (9). One possible explanation is that (9) is false. Another
possible explanation is that (9) is true, but the situation that prevails is
not a highly typical instance of this circumstance. All we can conclude with
certainty (assuming, as usual, that we are dealing with a cooperative and well-
informed speaker) is that the situation that prevails is not a highly typical
case of (9).
Therefore, from a typicality standpoint, we should not expect the implica-
ture “some” +> “not most” to be available, but rather the implicature “some”
+> “not typical-most”. This is an informationally weaker prediction, in that
the negation of “typical-most” entails the negation of “most”, and the precise
scope of the prediction naturally depends on what constitutes typical “most”.
Nevertheless, the prediction may be worth investigating in support of the
relevance of typicality in the quantity domain.
One final point to emphasise is that the relation of typicality effects to
intentional communication is not straightforward. Specifically, it could be
argued that speakers do not necessarily intend to convey typicality effects: if
all possible choices of expression are associated with some kind of typicality
structure, then the speaker cannot help but suggest some kind of typicality
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effect, irrespective of whether this is appropriate given the speaker’s knowl-
edge state. On a classically Gricean account, such as that endorsed by Geurts
& van Tiel (2013), this means that the typicality effects associated with the
utterance that is actually made are not considered to be communicated. By
contrast, the inappropriateness of the typical interpretations associated with
alternatives that were not uttered (as discussed above) could potentially be
considered to be communicated. Untangling this relationship might be a
useful avenue for future research.
6 Conclusion
Despite the recent wave of experimental literature on the topic, there is
still no consensus as to the nature and prevalence of embedded upper-
bound construals. Geurts & van Tiel (2013) draw attention to two major
obstacles to the interpretation of the existing experimental data: the presence
of contrast effects in the elicitation paradigms used, and the possibility
of typicality effects in the interpretation of scalar terms (and other items).
They convincingly demonstrate the difficulty of inferring the existence of
“embedded implicatures” on the basis of the data available so far. Perhaps
more importantly, they provide novel insights into some of the factors that
must be taken into account in future attempts to investigate this issue
experimentally. In this commentary, I argue that, if typicality effects really
are manifest in quantifiers, this has potentially far-reaching consequences for
how we should elicit and interpret experimental data in pragmatics, and for
how we should construe the nature and interface of semantic and pragmatic
meaning.
References
Bååth, Rasmus, Uli Sauerland & Sverker Sikstrøm. 2010. Quantifier use in
English and German: An online study. In Workshop on vague quantities and
vague quantifiers. Zentrum für Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft. Berlin.
Chemla, Emmanuel & Benjamin Spector. 2011. Experimental evidence for
embedded scalar implicatures. Journal of Semantics 28. 359–400. http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/ffq023.
Clifton, Charles & Chad Dube. 2010. Embedded implicatures observed: A




Cummins, Chris. 2012. Using embedded quantifiers. In Much ado about much:
The semantics and pragmatics of quantity expressions. Universität Kon-
stanz. Konstanz, Germany. http ://www.crcummins .com/Cummins_
Konstanz.pdf.
Geurts, Bart & Nausicaa Pouscoulous. 2009. Embedded implicatures?!? Se-
mantics and Pragmatics 2(4). 1–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.2.4.
Geurts, Bart & Bob van Tiel. 2013. Embedded scalars. Semantics and Pragmat-
ics 6(9). 1–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/sp.6.9.
Hackl, Martin. 2009. On the grammar and processing of proportional quanti-
fiers: Most versus more than half. Natural Language Semantics 17. 63–98.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11050-008-9039-x.
Katsos, Napoleon & Dorothy V. M. Bishop. 2011. Pragmatic tolerance: Implica-
tions for the acquisition of informativeness and implicature. Cognition
120. 67–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.02.015.
Levinson, Stephen C. 2000. Presumptive meanings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Solt, Stephanie. 2011. How many mosts? Sinn und Bedeutung 15. 565–579.
http://universaar.uni-saarland.de/monographien/volltexte/2011/30/
pdf/SinnUndBedeutung15.pdf.
van Tiel, Bob. 2013. Embedded scalars and typicality. Journal of Semantics
31(2). http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jos/fft002.
Chris Cummins
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language
Sciences
University of Edinburgh
c.r.cummins@gmail.com
8:15
